US & Turkey: Cold shoulders to unpredictability
Given the fraught nature of US-Turkish bilateral relations over the last decade, spanning both the current Biden administration and the first Trump administration, the outcome of the 2024 US elections presented Ankara with a dilemma.
The bones of contention between the two nations have been numerous: American concerns about the erosion of Turkish democracy, particularly restrictions imposed on freedom of speech; Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 air-defense system; the American recognition of the Armenian Genocide; Washington’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen; U.S. support for the Kurdish PYD-YPG in northern Syria; Turkey’s initial opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO; Turkey’s membership in BRICS; and, most recently, Ankara’s unprecedented pro-Hamas stance.
With so many significant disagreements, it is difficult to envision a promising future for US-Turkish relations.
Before Joe Biden’s inauguration, his campaign openly challenged Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. During a closed session in December 2019, Biden referred to Erdoğan as an “autocrat” and revealed his intention to support efforts to replace him with another leader through democratic elections. Unsurprisingly, these remarks provoked strong protests from Ankara. These events set the stage for a cold and contentious relationship.
Biden’s attitude towards Turkey remained unchanged after becoming president in January 2021. Consistent with his earlier statements, on April 24, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, Biden fulfilled his promise by officially recognizing the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Ankara refrained from joining the sanctions regime against Russia and pursued an “independent foreign policy.” While this turned Turkey into a hub for Russian flights and money, Ankara’s foreign policy cannot be labeled as pro-Russian. Erdoğan on numerous occasions stressed Turkey’s unequivocal support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
In retrospect, it is clear that Turkey leveraged NATO enlargement to circumvent the 2017 US CAATSA sanctions against its military industry, triggered by Ankara’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 anti-ballistic missiles. The acquisition placed Turkey in the category of “US opponent” — a status that requires sanctions under US law. On April 6, 2021, the sanctions were officially enacted. Three weeks later, on April 21, Turkey was removed from the F-35 program. As a result of these sanctions, Turkey not only lost the opportunity to acquire F-35s but was also prohibited from purchasing any American military technology, including F-16s.
Although Turkey publicly denied any linkage, Ankara effectively leveraged Sweden and Finland’s NATO admission to secure new F-16s as replacements for the F-35s.
President Donald Trump’s relationship with Turkey was altogether different. During Trump’s presidency, Erdoğan visited the White House twice and was effectively excused by Trump for his decision to purchase the S-400 systems. Notably, during the 2019 G20 summit, Trump openly blamed the Obama administration for the Turkish-Russian rapprochement.
Despite the warm dialogue, Trump, in contrast to Biden, became the first president to impose five separate sanctions on the Turks. These sanctions targeted the ministries of interior, justice and defense, as well as the ministers of interior and justice personally, along with officials from Turkish Defense Industries in their individual capacity.
Additionally, Trump signed an order to increase tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Turkey, inflicting significant damage to the Turkish economy. Trump also made threats on Twitter “to ruin the Turkish economy,” in response to Turkey’s detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson and its military operation against the Kurdish PYD-YPG in northern Syria.
On Nov. 6, Erdoğan officially congratulated Trump, emphasizing their personal relationship by referring to him as his “friend,” and expressing his wish to strengthen bilateral ties. However, despite Erdoğan’s desire to strengthen bilateral ties, significant challenges remain. Turkey’s attempts to join BRICS, an organization that seeks to challenge American dominance in international trade through de-dollarization, as well as Ankara’s unprecedented pro-Hamas stance against the State of Israel, will likely pose substantial obstacles.
Erdoğan appears to be aware of these complexities. Indeed, the Turkish president has acknowledged that improving relations depends not only on presidents but also on the influence of their cabinets.
As nominations to key positions in the US government take shape, the outlook appears increasingly bleak for Erdoğan. Tulsi Gabbard, one of the fiercest critics of Erdoğan’s Turkey, is slated to become the new director of US National Intelligence. Gabbard has accused Turkey of supporting jihadists and openly labeled Erdoğan “one of the most dangerous dictators in the world,” underlining that she does not see the Turkish president as a friend.
This sentiment is shared by the new secretary of state, Marco Rubio. And the staunchly pro-Israel nominee for secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has stated his worldview by declaring “Zionism and Americanism are today the front lines of Western civilization and freedom.” a clear message regarding Ankara’s anti-Israel policies.
Ankara is watching these developments closely. During a press conference Erdoğan’s AKP spokesperson, Omer Celik, stressed that his government is forming a road map for enhancing relations with their new American counterparts. But unless Turkey makes adjustments in its foreign policy, particularly regarding BRICS and Israel, Celik’s remarks will remain nothing more than wishful thinking.
As a NATO member, Turkey’s increasing and ironic alignment with the Russian-Chinese axis, including its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits, is viewed unfavorably in Washington, as is its growing interest BRICS, an economic bloc that seeks to challenge US global influence.
At the same time, Ankara’s pro-Hamas stance and the fact that it allows Hamas to use its territory for terrorist activities will inevitably become a significant obstacle to US-Turkish bilateral relations. Turkey’s foreign-policy divergence away from US preferences will limit Ankara’s maneuverability in northern Syria. Despite Turkish expectations, it seems that the new Trump administration will most likely not withdraw its troops from northern Syria, adding further tensions to the relationship.
DTrump’s latest statements about his desire to end all wars suggest that Ukraine may be the only arena where Turkey can align with US interests. Turkey’s ambivalent policy in the conflict positions it as a potential mediator capable of brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, thus offering Ankara a rare opportunity to please Washington.
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The future of US-Turkish relations remains highly uncertain, shaped by profound disagreements and competing priorities. While Erdoğan has expressed a willingness to strengthen ties, Turkey’s foreign policy poses significant challenges. The Trump administration, if consistent with its first-term approach, may maintain a transactional relationship with Ankara but is unlikely to make concessions on critical issues such as northern Syria or Israel, especially given the ideological positions of the new US cabinet.
To navigate this turbulent landscape, Turkey must carefully recalibrate its policies, balancing its strategic autonomy with the necessity of fostering constructive dialogue with Washington. Without meaningful adjustments, Ankara risks further alienation, narrowing its diplomatic options and exacerbating tensions in an already fraught bilateral relationship. At the same time, Turkey’s potential role as a mediator in Ukraine offers a rare opportunity to improve its standing with the United States, provided it can capitalize on its unique position in the conflict.
Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is the Turkey expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC) at Tel Aviv University
